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ARTICLE
THE COMMON GOOD REQUIRES ROBUST
INSTITUTIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
STANLEY CARLSON-THIES*
The topic of this Symposium seems inherently contradictory—relig-
ious freedom appears to be directly at odds with the common good. Many
in our society regard religious views and practices as harmful; to the extent
that they are right, religious freedom, by protecting those views and prac-
tices, allows action against the good of some, and thus against the good of
all—the common good. Even if religion is not generally bad, it comprises a
number of distinct belief systems and ways of life; religious freedom, by
protecting such sectarianism, contributes to, and deepens, divisions in soci-
ety. That outcome seems to be at right angles to whatever the common good
might be.
In opposition to views such as these, I will argue that a broad freedom
for religious exercise, including an extensive freedom for religious institu-
tions to be distinctive—to depart from generally accepted practices and
standards—is necessary to achieving the common good. Religious freedom
does not subvert the common good; rather, it is essential to it.
In my comments, I will generally ignore the limitations on religious
freedom that are also necessary, along with limits on other freedoms, if the
common good is to be secured. I do this to underscore the vital importance
of religious freedom itself to the common good. We are so accustomed to
arguments, laws, and legal decisions that warn against, and cabin, un-
bounded religious freedom, that its positive contribution to the common
good—moreover its indispensability—receives insufficient attention. I will
stress those positive contributions, while acknowledging that no freedom, in
practice, can be unbounded.
* Founder and Senior Director of the Institutional Religious Freedom Alliance, a division
of the Center for Public Justice; Ph.D., political science, 1993, University of Toronto. This article
is an elaboration of comments made for the Spring 2018 Symposium of the University of St.
Thomas Law Journal, “Religious Freedom and the Common Good” (March 23, 2018). My special
thanks to Professor Thomas Berg and his colleagues for the invitation to participate in this sympo-
sium, to the student editors who materially improved my text (without being responsible for any
remaining errors), and to the many scholars and practitioners, notably the late Stephen Monsma,
who have illuminated for me various facets of the topics considered here.
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By religious freedom, I mean protection in law for persons and organi-
zations to act or not act in accordance with their religious convictions—
within limits, of course—even when such action or refusal to act conflicts
with generally applicable laws or society’s general sense of what is right.
This legally protected religious freedom to be countercultural is a freedom
not only to hold different views or convictions, but a freedom to act or not
act based on those different views or convictions.1 It is a freedom not only
to act or not act in worship and in private spaces, such as churches and at
home, but also out in society. It is a freedom not only to do, or not do,
“religious” things, e.g., engage in worship or wear religious clothing, but to
act, or not act, as required by religious conviction in “secular” matters, such
as providing medical care. It is not only a personal freedom, but a protec-
tion for persons to join with others in creating and operating organizations
that act or do not act in accordance with religious conviction.
As to the concept of the “common good,” it is an important and com-
plex topic that receives special attention in the sophisticated body of Catho-
lic Social Teaching.2 In the following discussion, I will argue that the
common good should be a norm or goal for political communities.3 Accord-
ing to this political norm, every person in a political community ought to be
protected in order to exist and flourish, with no one treated worse than
others. The good of each and all ought to be promoted as much as possible,
including by means of communal actions undertaken by the government to
achieve outcomes and to provide goods that cannot be produced by any
individual, particular segment of society, or private institution or endeavor.
According to the political norm of the common good, laws, government
actions, and government programs must, as far as possible, aim for the good
of all, not the good of some over the good of others in the political
community.
How, then, might religious freedom, including legal protections that
enable religious organizations to operate and serve differently than do their
secular counterparts, contribute to the achievement of this political or gov-
ernmental common good for the promotion of the interests and flourishing
of all? Does religious freedom elevate the limited interests and convictions
of some over the interests and convictions of others? Indeed, it is a common
view that religious freedom, unless narrowly confined, constitutes a “right
to discriminate,” or a right to harm others.4 Therefore, I begin by briefly
discussing an event and policy study which pleaded for restrictions on relig-
1. For a much narrower definition of what religious freedom is or should be, see MARCI A.
HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF EXTREME RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2d ed. 2014).
2. For one helpful wide-ranging discussion of the concept, see generally IN SEARCH OF THE
COMMON GOOD (Patrick D. Miller & Dennis P. McCann eds., 2005).
3. Cf. James Skillen, The Common Good as Political Norm, in IN SEARCH OF THE COMMON
GOOD, supra note 2, at 256–78.
4. For two of the many expressions of this view, see generally U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: RECONCILING NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL LIB-
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ious freedom for the sake of the good of LGBTQ older adults. Their good,
of course, is part of the common good.
The event, held in New York City in December 2017, and the policy
study, released at that event, were both entitled “Dignity Denied: Religious
Exemptions and LGBT Elder Services.”5 Put simply, the authors presented
an argument that religious freedom enables discrimination against these
members of the political community like this: many religious traditions are
not LGBTQ-affirming; many elder services—in-home care, hospitals and
hospices, assisted living and retirement facilities—are operated by religious
communities. Thus, religious exemptions in laws and regulations that pro-
hibit discrimination against LGBTQ persons necessarily open the door to
harmful treatment of LGBTQ seniors. Such exemptions must not be al-
lowed. More freedom for religious people and institutions entails more suf-
fering for LGBTQ people; protecting religious freedom elevates the good of
religious people over LGBTQ people. If so, such a policy certainly would
violate the requirement that the government must promote the good of all—
the common good.
Early in the event, Carmelyn Malalis, Chair and Commissioner of the
New York City Commission on Human Rights, assured the audience, in
effect, that such an unjust elevation of religious freedom over LGBTQ
rights is not permitted in New York. The City proclaims that it is
home to one of the strongest anti-discrimination laws in the coun-
try, the NYC Human Rights Law, which protects individuals liv-
ing, working, and visiting New York City from discrimination
and bias in 22 protected categories, including sexual orientation,
race, religion, gender and immigration status.6
Chair Malalis spoke at some length about the investigations conducted by
the Commission, the penalties that are assessed, and the changes in practice
required of offending institutions. All of this was to reassure the audience
that the injustices LGBTQ senior citizens encounter in other places will not
occur in New York City, or, if they do take place, will be countered vigor-
ously by the municipal government.
ERTIES (2016), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/docs/Peaceful-Coexistence-09-07-16.pdf HAMILTON,
supra note 1, at 219–38.
5. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, PUBLIC RIGHTS/PRIVATE CONSCIENCE PROJECT &
SAGE, DIGNITY DENIED: RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS AND LGBT ELDER SERVICES (2017), http://
www.lgbtmap.org/dignity-denied-lgbt-older-adults. The event was held at Union Theological
Seminary, Dec. 15, 2017. Upcoming Events, UNION, https://utsnyc.edu/event/dignity-denied-reli
gious-exemptions-lgbt-elder-services-report-release-panel-discussion/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019).
6. New York City Files Amicus Brief on Behalf of 65 Jurisdictions in Support of Enforcing
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Law, N.Y.C.: OFFICE OF THE MAYOR (Oct. 30, 2017), https://
www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/698-17/new-york-city-files-amicus-brief-behalf-65-juris
dictions-support-enforcing-colorado (the Chairperson’s statement at the event was identical or
similar).
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This reassurance might be put in other terms: The New York City gov-
ernment is determined to use its authority and power on behalf of the com-
mon good—to protect every member of the political community. No one,
including LGBTQ older adults, will be turned away from, nor treated abu-
sively in, services for seniors (or by other services or facilities) due to their
identity, practices, or beliefs.
While this is a laudable commitment by the New York City govern-
ment, we might ask whether society loses something of significant value
when a government promotes the common good in this way. Specifically,
does the City’s extensive and intensive application of nondiscrimination
laws strongly undermine private organizations’ ability to be distinctive in
their services and cultures? As a result, does it diminish those private orga-
nizations’ ability to positively attract particular clients and patients, serving
those clients and patients the way the clients, patients, and organizations
believe is best?
To be sure, it is an essential good—part of the common good—when
LGBTQ older adults are able to find expert and loving care. However, as
the “Dignity Denied” project itself acknowledges, not everyone affirms or
regards as praiseworthy LGBTQ relationships and conduct. Some religious
communities live by a different understanding of acceptable and positive
sexual or intimate relationships.7 Their desire to live in accordance with an
alternative understanding need not signify that they intend any disrespect or
harm toward LGBTQ people, nor that they wish to prevent LGBTQ people
from living as they desire. But it does raise this question: is it not also a
positive good—part of the common good—that these other older adults,
persons who, because of their religious or moral views, prefer to be in an
environment that affirms traditional marriage and conservative sexual stan-
dards of conduct, also are able to find services and facilities that respect and
reflect their convictions, identities, and relationships?
I propose that promoting the good of all—securing the common
good—requires public policies that do not flatten out such differences
among private institutions in civil society, but instead, protect them.8 Every
person should be able to find, as much as is practicable, suitable facilities
and services. No one should suffer discrimination. And yet, if all persons
7. See, e.g., Religious Groups’ Official Positions on Same-Sex Marriage, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/07/religious-groups-official-positions-on-
same-sex-marriage/ (summarizing the views on same-sex marriage of a wide range of religious
traditions in the United States and providing links to statements from those various traditions).
8. I will say little about commercial private organizations, as opposed to religious and other
nonprofit organizations and houses of worship. There is strong public opinion that businesses
should not discriminate in employment and in providing goods and services. And, yet, is it not
part of the concept of a free market to be comprised of diverse establishments that appeal to varied
sets of employees and customers? For a penetrating discussion of religious freedom and commer-
cial entities, see RONALD J. COLOMBO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BUSINESS CORPORATION
(2014).
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are to find suitable facilities and services, a diversity of facilities and ser-
vices must be available. Some of these will be welcoming and affirming for
people of certain convictions and identities, but not for others, who will
instead find them to be unsuitable or even hostile. Other facilities and ser-
vices will be welcoming and affirming for persons with other convictions
and identities; yet, not all will be affirmed. Not feeling welcome every-
where may not be due to discrimination; rather, it may be the inevitable
consequence of the moral and religious heterogeneity of the public.9
The diversity of individuals—their varied self-understandings, con-
trasting or conflicting moral values and religious convictions, and diverse
ideals about conduct—can best be served by public policies that make a
diversity of service providers possible, rather than policies that minimize or
eliminate such moral or religious diversity in pursuit of the important goal
of eliminating wrongful discrimination.10 Thus, the common good requires
robust institutional religious freedom.
I. PROMOTING THE COMMON GOOD BY ENABLING PERSONS AND
ORGANIZATIONS TO BE TRUE TO THEIR CONVICTIONS
How might strong protections for religious freedom, including institu-
tional religious freedom, contribute to, and even be essential for, achieving
the common good in a political community? This symposium explores
whether, and how, religious freedom might be defended, since it “preserves
space for religious groups to benefit individuals and society.”11 Indeed, I
will take up this question, arguing that religious freedom contributes to the
common good by enabling faith-based organizations to offer both an exten-
sive volume and distinctive version of services.
I will begin, however, with two other positive connections between
religious freedom and the common good. These first two connections re-
present different aspects of this proposition: an essential part of promoting
the common good is having the government safeguard the people’s freedom
to be true to their various convictions and beliefs. If this is true, then pro-
moting the common good requires protecting the religious freedom of all
persons, in the first place, and all private institutions, in the second place.
9. STEPHEN V. MONSMA & STANLEY CARLSON-THIES, FREE TO SERVE: PROTECTING THE
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS 101–04 (2015).
10. Not all differential treatment or discrimination is wrongful, and not all wrongful discrimi-
nation should be made illegal. See the careful discussions in Richard W. Garnett, Religious Free-
dom and the Nondiscrimination Norm, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE
UNITED STATES: ACCOMMODATION AND ITS LIMITS 194, 194–227 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012); see
also Nathan A. Berkeley, Religious Freedom and LGBT Rights: Trading Zero Sum Approaches
for Careful Distinctions and Genuine Pluralism, 50 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 1–28 (2015); JOHN
CORVINO, RYAN T. ANDERSON & SHERIF GIRGIS, DEBATING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND DISCRIMINA-
TION (2017).
11. Symposium Brochure, Religious Freedom and the Common Good (on file with the Uni-
versity of St. Thomas Law Journal).
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Protecting what many are sure is, in fact, wrong, contributes to the common
good.12
A. Protect Individual Religious Freedom
Seeking to live consistently with deep convictions, religious or philo-
sophical, about what is right and wrong, worthy and trivial, is an aspect of
human nature. People desire “the right to be wrong,” to use Kevin Hasson’s
formulation.13 Generally, people desire for their actions and verbiage to ex-
press what they really believe; they intend their outward identity to be an
expression of their inward certainties.14
Thus, to promote and protect the common good—the good of every
member of the political community—the government must, as much as it
can, protect people’s freedom to live consistently with their convictions,
even though others do not share those convictions. If a law mandates acting
against some deep conviction, a religious accommodation that enables citi-
zens holding a contrary conviction nevertheless to live in accordance with
their beliefs is necessary. The accommodation—religious freedom—is a
freedom for persons not only to believe and worship contrary to society’s
consensus, but, consistent with the rights of others, to engage according to
those distinctive beliefs in public life, careers, and service to neighbors. It is
a freedom that enables people to receive what they themselves regard as
appropriate help, e.g., not being pressured to choose euthanasia or to abort
an unborn child diagnosed with Down syndrome if seeking medical care.
Government officials must not, on their own, decide what everyone
ought to believe or how they ought to act, and then require such beliefs and
action by everyone. They must not, despite the great value of democratic
decision-making, determine the majority’s preferred beliefs and then im-
pose those views on everyone as obligatory standards without religious
freedom or conscience protections. The First Amendment guarantees vari-
12. My thanks to Dr. Bernard Fryshman of the Association of Advanced Rabbinical and
Talmudic Schools for the reminder that religious freedom must protect religious exercise and
religious organizations even when the public does not value positively the things that religious
people and organizations do with their freedom.
13. See KEVIN SEAMUS HASSON, THE RIGHT TO BE WRONG: ENDING THE CULTURE WAR
OVER RELIGION IN AMERICA (2005).
14. Illustrative:
Both same-sex couples and committed religious believers argue that some aspects of
human identity are so fundamental that they should be left to each individual, free of all
nonessential regulation, even when manifested in conduct. For religious believers, the
conduct at issue is to live and act consistently with the demands of the Being that they
believe made us all and holds the whole world together. For same-sex couples, the
conduct at issue is to join personal commitment and sexual expression in a multi-faceted
intimate relationship with the person they love. And often, they are following their own
religious values in making the commitment to marry.
Brief for Douglas Laycock, Thomas C. Berg, David Blankenhorn, Marie A. Failinger & Edward
McGlynn Gaffney as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 13–14, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
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ous freedoms of belief and action, because coerced uniformity is not legiti-
mate.15 Similarly, other provisions in the Bill of Rights, the Constitution in
general, and our foundational political principles more broadly, all limit
what the federal, state, and local governments may rightly do in order to
protect such freedom—the ability to go in a different direction—of persons,
civil society institutions, and the market. To secure the good of each mem-
ber of the political community, and thus the common good, the government
must protect the freedom of each member to live in accordance with his or
her convictions.
The same opposition to coerced conformity is expressed in the protec-
tion of freedom of religion and conscience in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948.16 The Declaration seeks to promote “equal and ina-
lienable rights of all members of the human family” (emphasis added)—
common good language.17 Article 18 states that
[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or be-
lief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.18
In sum, to promote the common good, the government must provide
space for, rather than suppress, varied fundamental beliefs and the resulting
diverse patterns of action; it must protect the religious freedom of every
citizen as much as possible.
B. Protect Institutional Religious Freedom
My second connection between religious freedom and the common
good is an extension of the first: promoting the common good requires not
only protecting the ability of individuals to live in accordance with their
varied convictions, but also requires protecting the freedom of private orga-
nizations to manifest, in their operations and services, these varied convic-
tions and ways of life.
15. Here are four illuminating arguments from different traditions and settings for why relig-
ious conviction and conscience should be protected, not coerced. See HASSON, supra note 13; see
also ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE BE-
TWEEN PERSON AND STATE (2010) (especially Part I); see also CATHOLICISM AND RELIGIOUS FREE-
DOM: CONTEMPORARY REFLECTIONS ON VATICAN II’S DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
(Kenneth L. Grasso & Robert P. Hunt eds., 2006); JOHN WITTE, JR., THE REFORMATION OF
RIGHTS:  LAW, RELIGION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EARLY MODERN CALVINISM (2007).
16. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
17. Id. at pmbl.
18. Id. at pmbl., art. 18.
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One key way people put their convictions into practice is by creating
and operating private organizations—both nonprofit and for-profit.19 Orga-
nizations pursue objectives on a significant scale, and distinctive organiza-
tions pursue distinctive objectives on a significant scale. Because people
have different convictions about what should get done, and about how those
objectives should be achieved, protection of the people’s freedom to create
and operate distinctive organizations is an essential part of governmental
respect for the people.20 And, since protecting the ability of the members of
a political community to live in accordance with their convictions is a vital
part of promoting the common good, protecting institutional religious free-
dom is also a vital part of promoting the common good.21
Protecting institutional religious freedom is distinct from protecting
conscience rights.22 Our nation rightly safeguards conscience through legal
provisions that, for example, protect people from having to violate their
convictions regarding important matters, such as facilitating elective abor-
tions, assisting with capital punishment, and serving in combat. Such provi-
sions provide protections for people serving in institutions, whether
governmental or private.23 It protects employees who, for reasons of relig-
ious or moral conviction, seek the freedom to avoid something normally
required. Laws and regulations that protect conscience enable these employ-
ees to refuse to act in some way that is otherwise required by the organiza-
tion’s policies.
Yet, the freedom to live consistently with one’s countercultural con-
victions needs to extend beyond just the right to avoid something that others
in an organization are required to do; rather, it must include the freedom to
join with others to accomplish something distinctive by means of creating
19. I am specifically referencing organizations—not informal or non-organized groups or
“communities” of individuals (such as some “community of religious people” in contrast to non-
believers).
20. Compare to Justice Alito’s remarks in his majority opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014): “A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human
beings to achieve desired ends. . . . [Thus,] protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like
Hobby Lobby . . .  protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those
companies.”
21. On institutional religious freedom, or the religious freedom of religious organizations,
see, for example, MONSMA & CARLSON-THIES, supra note 9, passim; see also VISCHER, supra note
15; COLOMBO, supra note 8; Stanley Carlson-Thies, Keynote Address: Beyond Right of Con-
science to Freedom to Live Faithfully, 24 REGENT U.L. REV. 351, 351–68 (2012); Stanley Carl-
son-Thies, Why We Need Institutions in Order to be Faithful, and What Institutions Need So That
They Can be Faithful, 44 PRO REGE 1, 1–10 (2015).
22. Stanley Carlson-Thies, Keynote Address: Beyond the Right of Conscience to Freedom to
Live Faithfully, 24 REGENT U.L. REV. 351 (2012).
23. However, note that conscience protections in health care also generally protect institu-
tions themselves, such as hospitals, from having to participate in procedures that violate the insti-
tutions’ ethical guidelines. See SECRETARIAT OF PRO-LIFE ACTIVITIES, U.S. CONFERENCE OF
CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CURRENT FEDERAL LAWS PROTECTING CONSCIENCE RIGHTS (2016), http://
www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/conscience-protection/upload/Federal-Consci
ence-Laws.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2019).
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and operating distinctive organizations. This is a right to put a conviction
into practice along with others, which is more than a right to refrain from
doing what others are required to do.
Consider Catholic doctors and nurses with their pro-life commitments.
Conscience protections in the law shield them from being required to facili-
tate or perform elective abortions in federally-supported hospitals and other
medical facilities. Yet, there is more to pro-life medical care than avoiding
participation in elective abortions. The doctors and nurses may seek an in-
stitutional environment with a whole-person view of patients and col-
leagues, inclusive of spirituality and spiritual care. While deeply opposed to
policies they believe wrongfully hasten death, they may also be skeptical of
high-tech procedures and equipment that seem to falsely promise to avoid
the travails of sinful human life, favoring palliative care instead. On one
hand, avoiding the killing of unborn children is fundamental; however, on
the other hand, they may also regard it to be vital that the institution where
they work contributes extensively to the care of the poor in the surrounding
community via free clinical care and wellness programs.24
To find such a consistently pro-life workplace, the doctors and nurses
may choose a Catholic hospital or a Christian faith-based health clinic. That
is, they may choose such a hospital or clinic if the laws governing the crea-
tion and functioning of medical facilities do not require policies and prac-
tices that conflict with pro-life tenets, nor forbid protocols and programs
that affirm pro-life, pro-religion convictions. In a society in which some
people and organizations are pro-choice, and laws protect access to elective
abortions and reproductive health care, being able to live and serve accord-
ing to pro-life convictions requires legal protection for pro-life institutions,
not only individual conscience rights.
Some citizens, because of their religious convictions, desire to serve
and live in a way that the laws generally forbid. Respect for those citizens
and their convictions requires the government, absent a compelling contrary
interest, to provide a religious freedom accommodation that enables those
citizens to create and operate organizations in accordance with their convic-
tions. For a government to promote the common good by accommodating
its citizens’ convictions, a robust institutional religious freedom, putting
distinct views into practice, as well as individual religious freedom, is
required.25
24. This paragraph loosely follows a passage in Stanley Carlson-Thies, supra note 22, at
357–58; see also LEONARD J. NELSON, III, DIAGNOSIS CRITICAL: THE URGENT THREATS CON-
FRONTING CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE (2009).
25. There is an alternative strategy that purports to secure respect of everyone’s convictions:
requiring government policies and practices resolutely to avoid religious and other differences of
conviction. Rather than accommodate those diverse convictions, the government should ignore
them. Yet, the result of such a policy is not equal respect for all, but, rather, equal disrespect for
all, or, more likely, favoritism to some views over others. For example, when public schools are
required resolutely to exclude religion, they convey not neutrality but rather, an official view that
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II. PROMOTING THE COMMON GOOD BY PROTECTING THE SERVICES OF
FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS
The second set of connections between religious freedom and the com-
mon good involves Catholic health care institutions, as well as other faith-
based organizations.
I have argued that the common good requires the government maxi-
mally to accommodate the desire of all persons, to put their religious con-
victions into practice, individually and via organizations.  That entails
allowing persons and organizations to act, or not to act, differently than
generally required by law. Religious freedom also contributes to the com-
mon good in another vital way: through government protection and promo-
tion of the provision of services to our neighbors via faith-based
organizations.
You can call this the social utility, communal, or social welfare aspect
of the common good. In the United States, and even in countries that are
considered social welfare states, non-governmental organizations provide
much of this needed social welfare aid.26 Private donations fund many such
services, while the government funds much of the rest.27 Many of the non-
governmental organizations that provide such help are religious.28 Their
services may be supported by private funding, by government funding, or
by both.29 Institutional religious freedom enables them to serve extensively
and distinctively—two aspects of their contribution to the common good.
religion is irrelevant to life. This makes schools supposedly intended to be for all into institutions
hospitable only to some.
26. See, e.g., Final Report Summary - FACIT (Faith-Based Organisations and Exclusion in
European Cities), EUROPEAN COMM’N: CORDIS, https://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/55806_en.html
(last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (note that the project is funded by the European Union).
27. Nonprofit organizations may fund their operations and services not only from donations
and government awards but also by fees-for-service, honoraria, sales of publications, and en-
trepreneurial activity (e.g., operating a money-making catering service that provides employment
for the clients of the organization’s job-training services). For a classic discussion of various
funding sources, see generally KIRSTEN A. GRøNBJERG, UNDERSTANDING NONPROFIT FUNDING:
MANAGING REVENUES IN SOCIAL SERVICES AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS
(1993).
28. Stephen V. Monsma notes the difficulty of documenting the proportion of services pro-
vided by religious in comparison to non-religious organizations and then offers illustrative analy-
ses of several service domains. STEPHEN V. MONSMA, PLURALISM AND FREEDOM: FAITH-BASED
ORGANIZATIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 15–41 (2012); see also BYRON JOHNSON ET AL., BAY-
LOR INST. FOR STUDIES OF RELIGION, ASSESSING THE FAITH-BASED RESPONSE TO HOMELESSNESS
IN AMERICA: FINDINGS FROM ELEVEN CITIES (2017) (a recent study of the faith-based role in
services to the homeless).
29. See, e.g., STEPHEN V. MONSMA, PUTTING FAITH IN PARTNERSHIPS: WELFARE-TO-WORK
IN FOUR CITIES 125–71 (2004) (specifically, the data on funding sources for faith-based welfare-
to-work programs in four cities).
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A. The Quantitative Dimension of the Contribution from Faith-Based
Organizations
No complete accounting exists to show how extensive the services are
of faith-based organizations for the needy, or, more generally, how exten-
sive the contributions are to society provided by religious organizations,
whether houses of worship or religious nonprofits.30 We do not, however,
need extensive statistics to know how important these services are—there
are three quick indicators to prove their importance.
One indicator involves the startling announcement made by candidate
Barack Obama in his 2008 campaign for president, as well as his subse-
quent action as president. In that announcement, Obama declared, to the
great surprise of many, that he would continue, and even expand, the fed-
eral faith-based initiative launched by President George W. Bush, notwith-
standing the strong Democratic criticism of the Bush initiative. Why would
he press for even greater involvement by churches and other faith-based
organizations in federally-funded social service programs? Obama gave this
reason: “The challenges we face today—from saving our planet to ending
poverty—are simply too big for government to solve alone. We need an all-
hands-on-deck approach.”31 The “all-hands approach” he believed neces-
sary to respond to pressing social needs includes many religious organiza-
tions. Obama then pledged, and as president carried out, a continuation of
the faith-based initiative that many regarded as his predecessor’s pet
project.32
30. There are multiple reasons for this: the variety of religions, the many types of religious
organizations (informal and formal, small and large, related to a house of worship or denomina-
tion, or not, etc.), and the many ways religious persons and religious organizations contribute to
society. Another reason: although the federal government has taken many steps over the past two
decades, and more, to ensure that faith-based organizations are not excluded from the opportunity
to compete for, and win, federal funding to provide services, there is no requirement—for consti-
tutional reasons—that those organizations identify themselves as religious when seeking or re-
ceiving funding. For a recent discussion on the contributions of religion to the good of cities, and
the complexities of measuring those contributions, see the three Religion and the Good of the
Cities reports issued by the Social Cities initiative of Cardus. CARDUS, RELIGION AND THE GOOD
OF THE CITY: REPORT 1: THE CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL CONTEXT OF THE CITY (2017), https://
www.cardus.ca/research/social-cities/reports/religion-and-the-good-of-the-city-report-1/; CARDUS,
RELIGION AND THE GOOD OF THE CITY: REPORT 2: THE STATE OF RESEARCH AND INFLUENCE
(2017), https://www.cardus.ca/research/social-cities/reports/religion-and-the-good-of-the-city-re-
port-1/; CARDUS, RELIGION AND THE GOOD OF THE CITY: REPORT 3: THE FUTURE CONDITIONS OF
THE CITY (2017), https://www.cardus.ca/research/social-cities/reports/religion-and-the-good-of-
the-city-report-1/.
31. Jeff Zeleny & Michael Luo, Obama Seeks Bigger Roles for Religious Groups, N.Y.
TIMES (July 2, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/02/us/politics/02obama.html.
32. On the principles, and continuity over federal administrations, of the faith-based initia-
tive, see Carl H. Esbeck & Stanley Carlson-Thies, Happy Birthday Charitable Choice, 20 Years of
Success: Two Decades of Bipartisan Cooperation on Government Funding and Religion, INSTITU-
TIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ALL. (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.irfalliance.org/happy-birthday-
charitable-choice-20-years-of-success/.
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Here are two other indicators, both drawn from the path-breaking anal-
ysis of Brian J. Grim and Melissa E. Grim. Using a variety of data sources,
they estimated that American congregations, taken together, make an an-
nual contribution to society (expenditures on goods and salaries, the value
of social programs, and more) of $418 billion, and that religious charities,
such as hospitals, educational institutions, and social service agencies, add
another $302.9 billion in social and economic value.33 Almost all congrega-
tions offer some, or many, service programs to their surrounding communi-
ties—not only to their own members, the Grim and Grim report notes.  It
also points out that 40 percent of the largest charities are faith-based.
As candidate and president, Obama understood that many of the
“hands” that serve neighbors in elder care, health care, education, substance
abuse services, day care, services in prisons and for ex-prisoners, job train-
ing, as well as many others, are religious. These are all contributions to the
common good. When religious freedom makes it possible for organizations
that operate and serve differently from their secular counterparts neverthe-
less to offer their programs to the community, the common good is en-
hanced by the good they carry out.
But perhaps religious freedom is dispensable. If laws or court deci-
sions prohibited religiously-shaped means of operating and serving, result-
ing in faith-based service agencies closing their doors, and churches
restricting their services to members, would the contributions of these orga-
nizations to the poor and society simply be provided by the government and
secular organizations? There are good reasons to be skeptical.
No laws inhibit a great upswell of contributions to secular service
agencies, suggesting there is no army of donors-in-waiting willing to fund
private secular service providers in place of faith-based service providers.
While religious Americans, who donate more than secular Americans, give
more to secular causes as well as religious causes and organizations,34 it
seems unlikely that religious giving to social services, education, and health
care would continue at current levels if the religious service providers dis-
appeared. Note, too, that faith-based organizations that currently receive
government funding commonly add additional funds from their own donors
to support those services.35 And they may as well offer additional ser-
33. These numbers are from the summary sheet, Brian J. Grim & Melissa E. Grim, The
Socio-Economic Contributions of Religion to American Society: An Empirical Analysis, FAITH
COUNTS, http://faithcounts.com/wp-content/uploads/Summary-Sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 19,
2019); Brian J. Grim & Melissa E. Grim, The Socio-Economic Contributions of Religion to Ameri-
can Society: An Empirical Analysis, 12 INTERDISC. J. RES. ON RELIGION, 1, 1–31 (2016).
34. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIG-
ION DIVIDES AND UNITES US 444–54 (2010).
35. Note the comment of Rev. Larry Snyder, then President of Catholic Charities USA and
former head of Catholic Charities in Minneapolis:
I can say from my time in Minneapolis, the programs that we had that were contracted
with the government, the government would pay somewhere between two-thirds and
three-fourths of what we needed and we had to make up the rest. So we were subsi-
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-3\UST302.txt unknown Seq: 13  7-MAY-19 7:20
2019] ROBUST INSTITUTIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 541
vices—not government-compensated—such as providing ex-offenders con-
nections to new social networks to establish new patterns of life.36
It is even more difficult to imagine replacing the various kinds of posi-
tive contributions made by congregations, typically with little or no govern-
ment funding,37 if those congregations felt compelled to curtail services due
to expanding non-discrimination laws. Would the government dramatically
increase tax-funded services to replace the many services offered to their
surrounding neighbors by religious congregations? If so, what new non-
religious organizations would spring forth to provide those government-
funded services?38
Institutional religious freedom protects the congregations’ extensive
community-serving operations and the work of self-standing religious ser-
vice providers. This is the quantitative connection between protecting relig-
ious freedom and promoting fulfillment of the common good.  Yet,
religious organizations contribute vitally to the common good, not only in
the volume of services they provide, but also in how they serve and in the
choices they provide to clients, students, and patients.
B. The Qualitative Dimension of the Contribution from Faith-Based
Organizations
For this dimension, too, President Obama’s actions were illuminating.
The last report issued by his President’s Advisory Council for Faith-Based
and Neighborhood Partnerships, Strengthening Efforts to Increase Opportu-
nity and End Poverty,39 stresses how complex the problems of entrenched
poverty and extreme inequality are. These, the Council noted, “are social
ills with deep spiritual and communal implications. They not only perpetu-
ate lack of opportunity, but they also demean human dignity, crush the
dizing the government, if you will, by hundreds of thousands of dollars every year. We
were happy to do that because it furthered our mission and the mission of the common
good.
Reverend Larry Snyder, Panelist at The Brookings Inst. Symposium: Faith-Based and Neighbor-
hood Partnerships in the Obama Era: Assessing the First Year and Looking Ahead (Feb. 18
2010), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/20100218_faith_based.pdf (un-
corrected event transcript).
36. See, e.g., MONSMA, PLURALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 28, at 34–38.
37. For an overview of these contributions, see generally RAM CNAAN ET AL., THE INVISIBLE
CARING HAND: AMERICAN CONGREGATIONS AND THE PROVISION OF WELFARE (2002).
38. On the difficulties of replacing one set of service providers by another, even when the
two sets of organizations offer related or overlapping services, see, for example, Kinsey Hasstedt,
Federally Qualified Health Centers: Vital Sources of Care, No Substitute for the Family Planning
Safety Net, 20 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 67 (2017).
39. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON FAITH-BASED AND NEIGHBORHOOD PARTNERSHIPS,
STRENGTHENING EFFORTS TO INCREASE OPPORTUNITY AND END POVERTY: RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR FAITH-BASED AND NEIGHBORHOOD PARTNERSHIPS TO
ADDRESS POVERTY AND INEQUALITY (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/
files/docs/2017_advisory_council_report.pdf.
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human spirit, and sever family and communal bonds . . . .”40 Effective solu-
tions require government resources, the Council concluded, but “it is criti-
cal for these resources to be channeled in a manner that encourages
partnerships within local ecosystems of place-based actors, including indi-
viduals, faith-based and neighborhood groups, service providers, and public
institutions.”41 The report is an eloquent reminder that human problems are
complex, and that effective responses to these problems, and the develop-
ment of resilient and thriving local communities that forestall them, may
often require more than the delivery of standardized services, uniform
professionalized training, or narrowly physical or psychological interven-
tions. A faith dimension, spiritual resources, may be needed.
Indeed, because problems are complex and variegated, effective assis-
tance must also be variegated. What works for one person or community
may be less effective, or ineffective, for another. Variety is more likely to
promote the good of all than a single approach.  Thus, institutional religious
freedom, enabling religious options to be among those available, serves the
common good. As the US Conference of Catholic Bishops has observed,
the exclusion from the medical profession of doctors and nurses who reject
participating in abortions reduces the ability of the profession to serve well
the whole population of patients, as “[m]any patients want access to physi-
cians and other health care providers who do not see the taking of human
life as part of a profession devoted to healing.”42 Similarly, given the ex-
isting diversity of values and religions, it is no contradiction for the Human
Rights Campaign to urge government and private child welfare agencies to
adopt a wide range of “LGBTQ inclusive policies and affirming practices”
in the quest to encourage more LGBTQ persons and couples to become
foster or adoptive parents,43 while the Heritage Foundation urges legal pro-
tections for faith-based agencies committed to traditional marriage and sex-
uality in its quest to encourage more conservative and religious persons and
couples to step forward for the sake of children in need.44
I began by noting that some of our fellow citizens are sure that religion
is harmful to people, and thus religious freedom subtracts from the common
good. But, of course, many others are sure of the opposite: religion in gen-
eral, or particular religions, are good for people, allowing them to flourish
40. Id. at 11.
41. Id. at 12.
42. Letter from the Office of Gen. Counsel, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, to Dep’t of
Health and Human Services, Office of Public Health and Sci. (Mar. 23, 2009), http://
www.usccb.org/about/general-counsel/rulemaking/upload/comments-to-hss-on-conscience-2009-
03.pdf (concerning the Department’s proposed rescission of a 2008 conscience protection
regulation).
43. All Children-All Families: About the Project, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://
www.hrc.org/resources/all-children-all-families-about-the-initiative (last visited Feb. 19, 2019).
44. Natalie Goodnow, The Role of Faith-Based Agencies in Child Welfare, HERITAGE
FOUND. (May 22, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/civil-society/report/the-role-faith-based-agen
cies-child-welfare.
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in life, and helping them when in need. Some are sure that spiritual forces
are fake or harmful; others are sure that in instances such as substance
abuse treatment, a spiritual dimension is vital to lasting recovery. Many
health care personnel are committed to the pro-life approach, and many
others think such an approach is detrimental to the well-being of women.
In short, Americans are diverse in convictions, practices, and ethical
frameworks. We do not agree on what flourishing entails, how to help mar-
riages and families thrive, what set of treatments, policies, or societal and
individual changes will reverse the opioid epidemic, whether and what kind
of character formation should occur in schooling, and much more.
For our diverse population to be served well, service providers need
also be diverse; they must offer different treatments, educational programs,
and environments. Private funders do well to permit such diversity, and the
federal government, to its credit, has chosen to respect the diversity of ser-
vices in its initiative to protect and promote partnerships with religious, as
well as private secular, service providers. An “all-hands approach” is best
for our diverse society.
For a qualitative reason—diverse services best serve a diverse set of
patients, clients, students, and customers—government can best promote
the common good by protecting diverse institutions.
III. DISCRIMINATION IN SERVICES OR DIVERSITY OF SERVICES?
Those are my four connections between religious freedom, and in par-
ticular, institutional religious freedom and the common good.
Now, consider, again, the New York City conference and its deep con-
cern that LGBTQ elders might be mistreated by non-affirming faith-based
service providers and facilities, resulting in its strong policy recommenda-
tion to disallow religious exemptions to nondiscrimination law. That view
was strongly enforced by the comments of the Chair of the NYC Human
Rights Commission, who stressed the long list of protected categories
across so many facets of life.
LGBTQ elders, indeed, ought not to suffer exclusion and discrimina-
tory treatment. Yet other elders—those with conservative religious or moral
values—also deserve respectful treatment and hospitable facilities. Is not
the common good enhanced, rather than narrowed, when both sets of elders
are able to find institutions and services that welcome them? If so, then
nondiscrimination laws may not be the best approach to promoting the com-
mon good in circumstances like these.
A few months before the LGBTQ elder care conference, which
stressed maintaining strong nondiscrimination protections by minimizing
religious accommodations, the New York Times published an article that
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implicitly suggested an alternative approach.45 The article featured Mary
Ellen Green, a homeless lesbian who avoids harassment by patronizing a
Manhattan senior center serving the LGBTQ community.46  The center,
however, is only open on weekdays during business hours.47 But soon, the
article said, she might have a more permanent place to go, as the operator of
the senior center, as well as private developers, were building the city’s
“first subsidized housing for older people like Ms. Green who need a place
to live, may face discrimination from their neighbors, or simply want to
spend their later years among those they feel most comfortable with.”48 The
new housing, the article notes, is required by law not to exclude anyone
who meets the financial and age qualifications; however, the buildings “are
being heavily marketed to the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender com-
munities.”49 Specifically, one of the developers is quoted as stating, “It’s
our hope that we end up here with a building that is largely L.G.B.T. se-
niors or seniors who understand the L.G.B.T. community and are accepting
of it.”50
In my view, notwithstanding the strong legal and popular consensus
favoring a strict application of nondiscrimination law, the new Manhattan
senior buildings should be allowed by law to admit only LGBTQ persons
and couples. There should be no need to resort to the uncertain and suspect
subterfuge of targeted advertising. And yet, other seniors, too, should be
able to find appropriate senior facilities. Orthodox Jewish or Muslim se-
niors, as well as others who desire to live out their lives among older people
who share their beliefs about religion and family and marriage, should also
be able to find safe and inviting places, places where they, too, will be
surrounded by people “they feel most comfortable with,” as the New York
Times article put it.
Nondiscrimination law is essential, but it is not a magical tool that
automatically advances the common good. We should use it as sparingly as
possible, rather than seeking to expand it as far as we can possibly imagine.
In our ever more heterogeneous society, explicitly pluralist govern-
ment policies—policies that incorporate, rather than ignore or seek to un-
dermine different moral and religious patterns of values and conduct—
should be the policy prescription. That is the only way the government can
facilitate everyone’s desire to live consistently with their divergent deep
convictions. Less government regimentation and more civil society freedom
results in more of the common good.
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Pluralist policy—ensuring that multiple options are available—does
not eliminate grief. When there are LGBTQ-affirming senior facilities and
traditional-values elder facilities; Catholic, Montessori, Jewish, public (sec-
ular), and Protestant schools; LGBTQ-affirming as well as historic-mar-
riage adoption agencies; and Muslim law-student clubs alongside
evangelical student groups, everyone will be turned away somewhere. Each
of us will have to know to avoid particular businesses and nonprofits or else
we will enter some organization or program only to encounter distressing
discussion and treatment. That’s the reality of a heterogeneous society.  The
alternative, in which the government endorses and enforces the views and
preferences of just some segment of the populace, is not genuinely neutral
and it does not actually advance the (multifarious) common good.
Yet, pluralist policy is different than libertarian neglect. There is a vital
governmental purpose to ensure that people have access to acceptable
choices when they have a right to a service. An appropriate child welfare
policy, for example, will not allow a monopoly to either traditional values,
nor LGBTQ-affirming adoption agencies, just as school choice policies
must make it possible for families to choose a secular option, rather than
only religious private schools.
I will give the final word to the distinguished political theorist, Wil-
liam Galston, from his book, Liberal Pluralism. Given the legitimate diver-
sity that characterizes a society like ours, Galston says, good public policy
will be “parsimonious in specifying binding public principles and cautious
about employing such principles to intervene in the internal affairs of civil
associations. It will, rather, pursue a policy of maximum feasible accommo-
dation, limited only by the core requirements of individual security and
civic unity.”51
51. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM
FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 20 (2002).
